Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Bi

[ChrisMarie]

Accession Number : ADA465930

Title : Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Biometrics

Corporate Author : DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD WASHINGTON DC

Handle / proxy Url : http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA465930 Check NTIS Availability...

Report Date : MAR 2007

Pagination or Media Count : 179

Abstract : A Defense Science Board Task Force was organized to address a number of issues relating to the use of Biometrics in the Department of Defense. The Terms of Reference (Appendix A) asked that specific organizational issues be addressed promptly and the Task Force provided an interim briefing that focused on these issues. While the terms of reference refer to "biometrics," the Task Force is convinced that identity management is the more inclusive and the more useful construct. The Task Force holds two companion theses. First, while we can come up with an endless set of scenarios in which biometrics might be called upon to play a role, with analysis and a little abstraction without losing the essence, the endless array of scenarios can be reduced to a compact set of "use cases". This compact set of use cases will help us appreciate our companion thesis, that a common "back office" process (and associated "data model") can be envisioned to service all the biometric, and thus Identity Management, use cases. That said, we clearly did not have either the time or the resources to study Identity Management (IM) conclusively, especially in terms of the broadened set of organizational associations, use cases and Defense applications, and even social issues, attendant to that sprawling field.

Descriptors : *DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, *IDENTITIES, *BIOMETRIC SECURITY, SCENARIOS, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, DATA MANAGEMENT, TASK FORCES

Subject Categories : MISCELLANEOUS DETECTION AND DETECTORS
MEDICAL INSTRUMENTATION AND BIOENGINEERING

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE




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[ChrisMarie]

BIOMETRICS PUBLICATIONS

BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY
TESTING, EVALUATION, RESULTS

James L. Wayman, Director
U.S. National Biometric Test Center
College of Engineering
San Jose State University
San Jose, CA 95192
Phone: (408) 924-4037
biomet@email.sjsu.edu
www.engr.sjsu.edu/biometrics

In this paper, we’ll review the major activities and results in biometric testing and evaluation at the U.S. National Biometric Test Center over the past year. Testing and standards activities sponsored by other governments and independent groups will also be briefly discussed.

1.0 The U.S. National Biometric Test Center
Organized biometric device evaluation and testing at San Jose State University began in 1995 under funding from the Federal Highway Administration. The Department of Defense (DoD) took over support in 1997, conferring the title “National Biometric Test Center� (NBTC) on the effort. This funding is set to expire in the fall of this year, requiring us to broaden our base of support to additional governmental agencies.

Under DoD funding and the leadership of Dr. John Colombi, we have defined three general tasks in biometric testing and evaluation: 1) development of mathematical and statistical methods for test design and evaluation; 2) evaluation of technologies for specific applications of interest to the DoD; 3) device testing. The Department of Defense has no interest in device testing, so it is the first two tasks that have been the core of our efforts, in particular the development of mathematical and statistical methods to lower the cost of testing and to allow for testing from operational data.

1.1 Substitution of “Inter-template� for “Impostor� Distribution

In our study three years ago of the hand geometry system in the Immigration and Naturalization Service Passenger Accelerated Service System (INSPASS) application, we had available both the “genuine� and “inter-template� distance distributions. Because sample vectors were not stored by the system, we had no way of making random assignments of samples to non-matching templates to compute the “impostor� distribution. We wondered if a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve could be approximated using the “inter-template� distribution. Simulation models based on the available data show that this approach over-estimates errors. Figure 1 shows simulation results and the disparity of ROC curves based on “inter-template� and “impostor� distributions.

During the past year, considerable progress has been made in understanding this phenomenon. In reference [1], we have been able to explain the mathematical basis for the difference in these two curves. In theory, the “impostor� distribution is a higher-dimensional convolution of the “genuine� and “inter-template� distributions. In reference [2], commissioned by the NBTC, methods for convolving and de-convolving these distributions under limiting assumptions are presented.


1.2 Fingerprint Testing

During the past year, we have continued our benchmark fingerprint testing, documented originally in [3,4]. Two additional vendors have completed the full 4080x4128 comparison test and one vendor has performed a reduced 3200+3200 comparison test. No additional vendors have performed the penetration/bin error rate test. In the original test, two of the four vendors returned truncated data. To “level the playing field�, all vendor data was truncated in our previously reported results. Now that two additional vendors have returned full results, we can give as Figure 2 the non-truncated, unbiased ROC curves for the four vendors completing the full 4080x4128 comparison test.


One reasonable criticism of our test reporting has been that the ROC is computed from cross-comparisons of all fingerprints in the test database, regardless of classification partition. In an operational Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), only prints in communicating partitions would be compared. Using the “best� comparison results and the “best� partitioning results (different vendors), we have recomputed ROC and penetration results in a more articulated manner in reference [5]. Figure 3 shows the ROC for fingers from right hands, allowing comparisons only of prints in communicating partitions.

http://www.engr.sjsu.edu/biometrics/publications_technology.html
_________________
Call to Me and I will answer you, and I will tell you great and mighty things, which you do not know.
Jeremiah 33:3

Our WebSite / My Blog /Prayer Requests /Chat Room /